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PUBLIC FIGURES AND MALICE: RECENT SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS RESTRICTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
I. INTRODUCTION*
Historically, Americans have placed great importance on both their
good name and their right to free speech.1 "As ingrained as both of these
ideals are in the very fabric of our society, they sometimes run counter to
* The student contributors are Ann M. Annase and Scott A. Milburn.
1. 10 CREGHTON L. Rzv. 351 (1976).
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each other."2 The Supreme Court has tried to balance these conflicting
ideals in libel cases involving the first amendment's protection of freedom
of the press. In the 1964 case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 the
Court held that the first amendment's constitutional privilege extends to
those publishing defamatory statements concerning official conduct, and
that a plaintiff in such a case could not recover absent a showing of "ac-
tual malice." In the ten years following the New York Times decision, the
Court continued to expand the constitutional protection afforded the
press. However, lower courts were beseiged by a multitude of defamation
cases, which has apparently caused the Supreme Court, in recent cases, to
limit the constitutional protection afforded the press, resulting in greater
protection for the individual.
In the 1978 term the Court in Hutchinson v. Proxmire4 and Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Association5 appears to have narrowed the class of
figures to which the actual malice standard applies. Furthermore, in Her-
bert v. Lando,6 decided in the same term, the Court has insured that
those plaintiffs who are classified as public figures will have a broad range
of discovery tools to aid them in meeting their burden of proof.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
There was a general recognition in the common law of a qualified privi-
lege in defamation actions of what was called "fair comment" upon the
conduct and qualifications of public officers and employees.7 This privi-
lege extended to encompass publication of matters of general concern to
the public.' Matters which have been held to be of general concern to the
2. Id.
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
5. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
6. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
7. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 819 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter PROSSER]. See Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 577 (1959) (Black, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Black observed that
The effective functioning of a free government like ours depends largely on the
force of an informed public opinion. This calls for the widest possible understanding
of the quality of government service rendered by all elective or appointed public offi-
cials or employees. Such an informed understanding depends, of course, on the free-
dom people have to applaud or criticize the way public employees do their jobs, from
the least to the most important.
See also Everett v. Cal. Teacher's Assn., 208 Cal. App.2d 291, 25 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1962);
Knapp v. Post Printing & Pub. Co., 111 Colo. 492, 144 P.2d 981 (1943); White v. Fletcher,
90 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1956); Morgan v. Bulletin Co., 369 Pa. 349, 85 A.2d 869 (1952); Cart-
wright v. Herald Pub. Co., 220 S.C. 492, 68 S.E.2d 415 (1951).
8. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 819.
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public include such items as the management of public institutions, the
conduct of private enterprise affecting the general community, and the
performance of those who submit their talents to the public for approval.9
While the existence of this privilege was undisputed, there was disa-
greement as to whether it was restricted to statements expressing only
"comment" or opinion, as distinguished from misstatements of fact.1" A
majority of courts required the defendant who raised the defense of fair
comment in a libel or slander case to prove that the statements he made
were "honest expressions of opinion on matters of legitimate public inter-
est where based upon a true or privileged statement of fact." '11 The reason
usually given was, that while men in public life must expect to be sub-
jected to public comment, opinion, and criticism, they were not to be
made the victims of misrepresentations of fact so as to deter desirable
candidates from seeking office and thereby injuring the public interest. 2
A small number of courts have extended the defense of fair comment to
all of the statements made by the defendant regarding the public activi-
ties of the plaintiff.1 3 In those jurisdictions, the defendant need only
prove that he honestly believed what he said was true, that he was not
motivated by malice, and that he met certain standards of fairness.14
Under the fair comment privilege courts have long had to determine
whether a remark was of a public or private concern, and statements
which enjoy the protection of the defense of fair comment are privileged
even though they are defamatory.15
9. Note, The Scope of First Amendment Protection For Good-Faith Defamatory Error,
75 YLE L.J'. 642, 645 (1966) [hereinafter YALE L.J.].
10. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 819.
11. Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair
Comment, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1203 (1962) [hereinafter Titus]. See also A.S. Abell Co. v.
Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 176 A.2d 340 (1961); Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257
(1947); Murphy v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am., 72 N.W.2d 636 (N.D. 1955); Wes-
tropp v. E.W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E.2d 340 (1947); Owens v. Scott Pub. Co.,
46 Wash.2d 666, 284 P.2d 296 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 968 (1956).
12. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 819-20.
13. Titus, supra note 11, at 1204. See also Snively v. Record Pub. Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198
P. 1 (1921); Salinger v. Cowles, 195 Iowa 873, 191 N.W. 167 (1922); Coleman v. MacLennan,
78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908); Clancey v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 277 N.W. 264
(1938); Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962).
14. Titus, supra note 11, at 1204.
15. Id.; YALE L.J., supra note 9, at 645. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977)
states: "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him." See Sheridan v. Davies, 139 Kan. 256, 31"P.2d 51, 54 (1934); Seested v.
Post Printing & Pub. Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1045, 1052 (1930).
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In Thornhill v. Alabama,16 decided almost three decades ago, the Su-
preme Court stated that:
The safeguarding of [freedom of speech and of the pressj to the ends that
men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods
may be exposed through the process of education and discussion is essential
to free government. Those who won our independence had confidence in the
power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas .... 17
The Court went on to say that in order for freedom of discussion to "ful-
fill its historic function in this nation, [it] must embrace all issues about
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of so-
ciety to cope with the exigencies of their period ... ."18 "[The freedom
of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at
least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public
concern without previous restraint or fear of subhequent punishment." 19
While freedom of speech and of the press in defamation cases was often
mentioned as an argument in support of a decision at common law hold-
ing that the particular conduct of the defendant was privileged, it was not
until 1964 in New York Times 20 that the Supreme Court held that the
first amendment itself required the privilege.21 The Court considered the
case against what it referred to as "the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials."2 2 The Court held that a public official could not recover
damages for defamation relating to his official conduct unless he proved
that the statement was made with "actual malice." 23 Actual malice was
defined as a statement made with knowledge of its falsity or with "reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not."2 4
In New York Times, the Court adopted the common law minority posi-
16. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
17. Id. at 95.
18. Id. at 102.
19. Id. at 101-02.
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan, the Public Safety Commissioner in Montgomery, Ala-
bama sued the New York Times for defamatory publication of a paid advertisement that
falsely described police treatment of civil rights protestors. Even though the advertisement
did not mention Sullivan by name, he claimed the advertisement referred to him because
his responsibilities as commissioner included supervision of the police department.
21. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 819.
22. 376 U.S. at 270.
23. Id. at 279.
24. Id. at 280.
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ton, as stated in Coleman v. MacLennan, that the occasion gave rise to a
privilege, that the plaintiff must show actual malice to recover damages,
and that the "privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes
matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office."25
In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg stated that one of the main
purposes of the first amendment is to afford people an opportunity to
"determine and resolve public issues," and that whenever "public matters
are involved, [any] doubts should be resolved in favor of freedom of ex-
pression rather than against it." '28
The process of expanding the application of the constitutional privilege
began in the lower courts by transformation of the "public official con-
cept" into a "government affiliation test. '27 In Rosenblatt v. Baer, the
Supreme Couit held that the former supervisor of a county recreation
area could be a public official within the meaning of New York Times.2 8
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, defined "public official" as ap-
plying to "those among the hierarchy of government employees who have,
or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control
over the conduct of governmental affairs. '29 The New York Times "actual
malice" test applies whenever the public has an independent interest in
the qualifications and performance of the person, beyond that which the
general public has in the qualifications of all government employees
based on the apparent or actual importance of the position. 0
25. 78 Kan. 711, 723, 98 P. 281, 285 (1908) cited in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 281-82.
26. 376 U.S. at 302 (Goldberg, J., concurring)(citation omitted).
27. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond. An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1377 (1975) [hereinafter Eaton]. See
also Eadie v. Pole, 91 N.J. Super. 504, 221 A.2d 547 (1966) (tax assessor held public official);
Schneph v. New York Post Corp., 16 N.Y.2d 1009, 265 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1965) (municipal ser-
vice attorney held public official); Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc.2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1965)
(off-duty police lieutenant held public official).
28. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). Justice Brennan noted that in New York Times "we had no occa-
sion. . . 'to determine how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the
"public official" designation would extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise specify
categories of persons who would or would not be included."' Id. at 85, quoting New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283, n.23.
29. 383 U.S. at 85.
30. Id. at 86. The article did not refer to Baer by name. "Thus to prove [that] the article
referred to him he showed the importance of his role; the same showing, at the least, raises a
substantial argument that he was a 'public official."' Id. at 87.
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A. Expansion and Refinement of the Public Figure Doctrine
In 1967, the Supreme Court in the companion cases of Curtis Publish-
ing Company v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walkers" extended the
"actual malice" test to apply to what was called "public figures" as well
as public officials. Butts, the coach of the University of Georgia football
team, had been accused by the Saturday Evening Post of fixing a football
game with the coach at the University of Alabama. Walker, a retired
United States Army General was reported in an Associated Press news
dispatch as having taken command of a crowd and having lead a charge
against federal marshalls during riots at the University of Mississippi. All
seven Justices who decided the case held that Butts and Walker were
public figures for first amendment purposes.3 2 "The present cases involve
not 'public officials,' but 'public figures' whose views ... are often of as
much concern to the citizen as the attitudes and behavior of 'public offi-
cials' with respect to the same issues and events."33 The Court did not
actually define what a public figure was but stated that both Butts and
Walker attained that status by the substantial amount of independent
public interest they commanded at the time.34 Butts may have obtained
the status of a public figure by his position alone, and Walker by his
"purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the
'vortex' of an important public controversy," but both commanded suffi-
cient continuing public interest and had sufficient access to the media to
enable them to "'expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies'
of the defamatory statements."3 5
Four years later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.36 a plurality of the
31. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
32. Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
33. Id.
In many situations, policy determinations which... were channeled through for-
mal political institutions are now originated and implemented through a complex ar-
ray of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some only
loosely connected with the Government. This blending of positions and power has
also occurred in the case of individuals so that many who do not hold public office at
the moment are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important pub-
lic questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at
large . . . "[P]ublic figures," like "public officials," often play an influential role in
ordering society.
Id. at 163-64.
34. Id. at 154.
35. Id. at 155.
36. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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Court further extended the constitutional privilege to include all matters
of general or public interest. The Court stated that if a matter is of gen-
eral interest to the public it is not less so because a private individual
may have become involuntarily involved.37 Rosenbloom, a magazine dis-
tributor in the Philadelphia area, was labeled by a local radio station as a
smut merchant. Rosenbloom had been arrested for distributing obscene
literature but was later acquitted of the charge. The plurality held that
"[w]e honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is
embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protec-
tion to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or
general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are fa-
mous or anonymous."" The legal effect of Rosenbloom, therefore, was to
equate any private individual involved in an event of public interest with
public officials and public figures.
By 1974, hundreds of post-New York Times defamation cases had been
before the courts.39 "The [result] of this avalanche of litigation was a con-
tinuing struggle to find the appropriate balance between the rights of free
speech and the press and the right to be free from character attacks."'40 In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.4 1 a majority of the Court retreated from its
earlier position by holding that states no longer had to follow the stan-
dard set forth in Rosenbloom which required private figures involved in
events of public or general interest to show actual malice. Gertz, a promi-
nent Chicago attorney, had been retained by the family of a youth shot
and killed by a Chicago policeman. The trial attracted widespread atten-
tion in the area and an article was published in the John Birch Society
magazine 'describing Gertz as a "communist-fronter" and a "Leninist."
The Court said it was abandoning the holding in Rosenbloom because:
The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom
plurality would abridge . .. legitimate state interest to a degree that we
find unacceptable. And it would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing
state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications
address issues of "general or public interest" and which do not-to deter-
37. Id. at 43.
38, Id. at 43-44.
39. Yasser, Defamation as a Constitutional Tort: With Actual Malice for All, 12 TULSA
L.J. 601, 614 (1977) [hereinafter Yasser].
40. Id.
41. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court left the standard of proof required of private plaintiffs
up to the states as long as they did not impose liability without fault. The Court also re-
stricted recovery by private individuals not proving actual malice to compensation for actual
injury. Upon a showing of actual malice both presumed and punitive damages could be
recovered.
1980]
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mine, in the words of Mr. Justice Marshall, "what information is relevant to
self government." We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the con-
science of judges. 42
"Thus the 'public or general interest' test for determining the applicabil-
ity of the New York Times standard was rejected as inadequately serving
the competing values at stake.
'4 3
The Court then addressed the issue of whether Gertz was a public
figure for the purposes of applying the New York Times test. Once again
the Court was not very helpful in delineating between public figure and
private person.4 4 The Court stated that some individuals become public
figures for "all purposes and in all contexts" due to the "pervasive fame
or notoriety" they have achieved.45 However, more commonly, an individ-
ual "voluntarily injects himself" or finds himself "drawn into a particular
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited
range of issues. 46
The Court stated that, unless it is clear that an individual has attained
general fame or notoriety in the affairs of society, he should not be
deemed a public figure for all aspects of his life.47 The Court tried to
reduce the public figure doctrine to a more meaningful context. It looked
to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular
controversy giving rise to the defamation to determine whether the plain-
tiff had thrust himself into "the vortex of this public issue," or engaged
the public's attention in an attempt to influence the outcome of the con-
troversy.48 The Court recognized that in some cases it may be possible for
an individual to become a public figure through no purposeful action of
42. Id. at 346 (citation omitted). In the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas:
a State impinges upon free and open discussion when it sanctions the imposition of
damages for such discussion through its civil libel laws. Discussion of public affairs is
often marked by highly charged emotions, and jurymen, not unlike us all, are subject
to those emotions. It is indeed this very type of speech which is the reason for the
First Amendment since speech which arouses little emotion is little in need of
protection.
Id. at 359 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Comment, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1547 (1972).
43. Yasser, supra note 39, at 615. The Court in Gertz felt that private individuals were
more vulnerable to defamation than were public officials and public figures. Therefore it was
necessary for the state to retain substantial latitude in enforcing legal remedies for defama-
tion in order to protect the reputation of a private individual. 418 U.S. at 345-46.
44. Bamberger, Public Figures and the Law of Libel: A Concept in Search of a Defini-
tion, 33 Bus. LAW. 709 (1978).
45. 418 U.S. at 351.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 352.
48. Id.
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his own, "but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be
exceedingly rare.
' 49
The most significant aspect of the Court's opinion is the distinction it
draws between public figures and private individuals,50 a distinction
which is important because "the outcome of much future litigation will
pivot on which side of the line the plaintiff is placed." 51 It should be
noted, however, that some cases decided after Gertz have expressed diffi-
culty in applying the standards supplied by the Supreme Court for deter-
mining who is a public figure.52 One district court has asked, "How and
where do we draw a line between public figures and private individuals?
... Defining public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the
wall. ,M
While the Court's dividing line between public figures and private indi-
viduals is somewhat blurred, it is clear that the Court has shifted its focus
from public interest to the nature and extent of the plaintiff's participa-
tion in a public controversy in order to determine the availability of the
constitutional privilege." The Gertz standard appears to establish three
categories of public figures: 1) the individual who voluntarily participates
or is drawn into a public controversy becoming a limited public figure; 2)
the individual who occupies a position of power and influence or who has
attained general fame or notoriety in the community because of his
achievements and thus becomes a public figure for all purposes; and 3)
the involuntary public figure. The Court did not set forth any explanation
of how one becomes an involuntary public figure. 55
49. Id. at 345. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
[V]oluntarily or not, we are all "public" men to some degree. Conversely, some as-
pects of the lives of even the most public men fall outside the area of matters of
public or general concern .... Thus, the idea that certain "public" figures have vol-
untarily exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals have
kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at best, a legal fiction.
Id. at 364, citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. at 48.
50. Eaton, supra note 27, at 1419.
51. Id.
52. 75 A.L.R.3d 616 (1977).
53. Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
54. Eaton, supra note 27, at 1425. Gertz preserves an action for defamation for a private
person who is involuntarily involved in a matter of public interest or concern, whereas, a
private person who is voluntarily involved in a matter of public interest or concern is still
subject to the New York Times standard. Id. at 1424 n.307.
55. Id. at 1421-22. In Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the plaintiffs
appeared to be involuntary public figures. The plaintiffs were the children of parents who
had been found guilty of conspiring to transmit information relating to the national defense
more than twenty years before. Although the children had changed their names, and were
thrown into the limelight involuntarily, they were held to be public figures. The court found
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A look at Supreme Court decision in recent years may aid in establish-
ing the perimeters of the elusive concept of public figure. In Time, Inc. v.
Firestone,"5 the Court confirmed its decision in Gertz to shift the focus
from the event to the individual. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts and held that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure since she had
not assumed "any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society,
other than perhaps Palm Beach society."5" The Court stated that while
the divorce proceedings of wealthy individuals may interest some portion
of the reading public, it is not the sort of public controversy referred to in
Gertz.'s The Court also found that she did not "thrust herself to the fore-
front of any particular public controversy in order to influence the resolu-
tion of the issues involved in it."59 The Court noted that Mrs. Firestone
was compelled to resort to judicial proceedings in order to obtain a legal
release from the bonds of matrimony.60
Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, noted that Mrs. Firestone was
prominent among Palm Beach society; her actions attracted the attention
of a sizeable portion of the public and her appearances in the public were
numerous enough to "warrant her subscribing to a press-clipping ser-
vice.""1 He also noted that the Firestones' marital difficulties were well
known, that the law suit became "a veritable cause celebre in social cir-
cles across the country," and that "[flar from shunning the publicity,
Mrs. Firestone held several press conferences in the course of the pro-
ceedings. '6 2 In coming to the conclusion that Mrs. Firestone was a public
figure, Justice Marshall distinguished her from a private individual on
two grounds. First, he found it significant that a private individual would
that as children of famous parents they had achieved roles of special prominence in the
affairs of society which invited attention and comment. In granting summary judgment in
favor of the author, the court also pointed to the fact that defamatory statements were
related to the time when the family was in the public eye.
56. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). Mrs. Firestone, wife of Russell Firestone, heir to the tire fortune,
sued Time magazine for publishing that her husband was granted a divorce from her on the
grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. Although Russell Firestone had alleged extreme
cruelty and adultery in his complaint, the court granted the divorce because of lack of do-
mestication of the parties. When Time refused to retract the report Mrs. Firestone brought
a libel action against the magazine.
57. Id. at 453. The Court refused to extend the actual malice standard to reports of judi-
cial proceedings in general, holding that inaccurate and false statements in reports of judi-
cial proceedings have no New York Times privilege. Id. at 457. Contra, 25 EMORY L.J. 705
(1976).
58. 424 U.S. at 454.
59. Id. at 453.
60. Id. at 454.
61. Id. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
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not have had the access to the media that Mrs. Firestone enjoyed and
therefore would have been deserving of greater protection. 3 Secondly, the
fact that Mrs. Firestone initiated the law suit and held press conferences
indicated that she had thrust herself into the forefront of a public contro-
versy that invited attention and comment.6
The Court in Firestone narrowed the standard defined in Gertz to two
classes of public figures. The standard for all purpose public figures re-
mains essentially the same. 5 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
"chose the standard from Gertz which described public figures for limited
purposes as those who 'have thrust themselves to the forefront of particu-
lar public controversies in order to influence the resolutions of the issues
involved.' "66 In choosing the "thrusting" language from Gertz instead of
defining public figure as one who "voluntarily injects or is drawn into a
particular public controversy," it appears that the Court has eliminated
this class of involuntary public figures.6 7 Lower courts, taking account of
Firestone when faced with a public figure determination, have come up
with conflicting results. 8
Even though the Rehnquist opinion in Firestone cites Butts with ap-
proval, it does not appear that Butts had any "especial prominence in the
affairs of society" or "thrust himself into the forefront of a particular con-
troversy" any more than Mrs. Firestone.6 Also, the Court in Firestone
noted that divorce was not the type of public controversy discussed in
Gertz, but left unanswered the question as to what events or issues merit
a public controversy status.70 Furthermore, the Court has left unanswered
63. Id.
64. Id. at 486-87.
65. Compton, Developing Standards of Care After Time, Inc. v. Firestone: Experimenta-
tion is Needed, 29 MERcER L. REv. 841, 849 (1978) [hereinafter Compton].
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See, Ryder v. Time, Inc., 557 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Appleyard v. Transamerican
Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1976); Transworld Ac-
counts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers,
Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1976). See generally, Annot. 75
A.L.R.3d 616 (1977).
69. 424 U.S. at 453.
70. One of the most interesting lower court decisions decided after Firestone dealing with
the public figure concept was Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.
Ga. 1976). Rosanova sued Playboy magazine for an article it published in which the plaintiff
was labelled as a mobster. The plaitiff admitted that he was socially acquainted with many
"underworld figures" due to his business connections with two golf clubs in the Chicago
area. Although the plaintiff had been subject to governmental investigations and prosecu-
tions, he had never been convicted of a crime. The plaintiff contended that he was not a
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the question of whether the class of involuntary public figures has really
been eliminated.
71
B. The 1979 Decisions Dealing With the Public Figure Concept
Two 1979 Supreme Court decisions dealing with the public figure con-
cept, Hutchinson72 and Wolston,73 have clarified the position of the Su-
preme Court regarding the status of the public figure in some respects
but have left many issues still unresolved. The confusion existing in the
lower courts as to what constitutes a public figure is apparent from the
fact that the Supreme Court in both cases reversed lower court holdings
which had held that the plaintiffs were public figures.
In Hutchinson, Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin awarded his "Golden
Fleece of the Month Award" to federal agencies which had funded Dr.
Hutchinson's study of emotional behavior.7 4 Proxmire's purpose in mak-
ing these monthly awards was to bring to the public's attention what he
termed to be the most "egregious examples of wasteful governmental
spending. 7 5 The award was announced in a speech 6 the text of which
public figure because "he had not thrust himself into the vortex of any public issue" and he
did not have sufficient access to the media to contradict the statements of the defendant
magazine. Rosanova further contended that a private individual is not a public figure
"merely because other publishers have printed unsupported allegations concerning him." Id.
at 444-45. The court rejected Rosanova's arguments and held that he was a public figure
because his voluntary contacts and involvement with members of the underworld were
bound to invite attention and comment.
It would appear from the Rosanova decision that voluntary associations with persons who
have attained pervasive fame or notoriety in society is sufficient to render a person a public
figure for the limited purpose of comment upon his voluntary contacts and involvement
resulting from such associations. The decision also indicates that comment on the activities
relating to underworld figures would be considered the type of public controversy referred
to in Gertz.
71. See note 55 supra. If Meeropol is still considered valid, it would appear that involun-
tary associations or relationships with individuals who have attained pervasive fame or no-
toriety in the past is sufficient to render persons public figures for at least the limited pur-
pose of comment on the activities relating to the prior events, even after a substantial
period of time has elapsed.
72. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
73. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
74. The government contributed over $500,000 to fund Hutchinson's research. The study
focused on finding an "objective measure of aggression, concentrating upon the behavior
patterns of certain animals (including monkeys), such as the clenching of jaws when they
were exposed to various aggravating stressful stimuli." 443 U.S. at 115.
75. Id. at 114.
76. Id. at 115-16. Proxmire is not certain that he actually delivered the speech on the
Senate floor. He said he may have merely inserted it into the Congressional Record. The
Court assumed, without deciding, for the purpose of this case that a speech printed in the
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was incorporated in a widely distributed press releasem " It was also re-
ferred to in newsletters sent out by the Senator, in a television program
on which the Senator appeared, and in telephone calls made by his legis-
lative assistant to the sponsoring federal agencies.78 The lower courts held
that Dr. Hutchinson was a public figure because he actively solicited pub-
lic funds and voluntarily participated in activities of public controversy -
namely the expenditure of public funds.7
The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the lower courts and held
that Dr. Hutchinson was not a limited public figure because he did not
"thrust himself or his views" into a public controversy in order to influ-
ence others.80 The Court went on to. state that in fact "[rlespondents have
not identified such a particular controversy; at most they point to a con-
cern about general public expenditures. But that concern is shared by
Congressional Record carries immunity under the speech or debate clause, U.S. CONSTITU-
TION, art. 1, § 6, as though delivered on the floor. Id. at 116, n.3.
77. The text of the speech incorporated in the press release concluded with the following
comment:
The funding of this nonsense makes me almost angry enough to scream and kick or
even clench my jaws. It seems to me it is outrageous.
Dr. Hutchinson's studies should make the taxpayers as well as his monkeys grind
their teeth. In fact, the good doctor has made a fortune from his monkeys and in the
process made a monkey out of the American taxpayer.
It. is time for the Federal Government to get out of this "monkey business." In view
of the transparent worthlessness of Hutchinson's study of jaw-grinding and biting by
angry or hard-drinking monkeys, it is time we put a stop to the bite Hutchinson and
the bureaucrats who fund him have been taking of the American taxpayer.
121 CONG. REc. 10803 (1975) cited in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 116.
78. Although it is beyond the scope of this article the Court also held that the speech or
debate clause did not immunize the Senator from liability for defamation for statements
made in newsletters and press releases where neither was "essential to the deliberations of
the Senate" and neither was part of the deliberative process; newsletters and press releases
likewise were not privileged as part of the "informing function" of Congress. Id. at 130-33.
79. 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1327 (1977). The Court also held that Dr. Hutchinson was a public
official because of the important public position he held as director of research at the
Kalamazoo State Hospital; also he was dealt with as a responsible public official by the
federal agencies that funded his research; and he held himself out as president of a not-for-
profit corporation that purports to act in the public interest. See Adey v. United Action for
Animals, 361 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 842 (1974), where "the district court held that a research scientist employed by NASA
and involved in planning a space flight for a monkey, was both a public figure and a public
official for the purpose of an action based on allegedly defamatory remarks about his treat-
ment of experimental animals." 431 F. Supp. at 1327.
The court of appeals did not decide whether the district court was correct in holding that
Hutchinson was a public official in light of its decision that Hutchinson was a public figure.
579 F.2d 1027, 1035 n.14 (1978).
80. 443 U.S. at 135.
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most and relates to most public expenditures; it is not sufficient to make
Hutchinson a public figure.""1
The Court also found that Dr. Hutchinson had not attained such prom-
inence as to render him a public figure for all purposes. Neither local
newspaper reports of Dr. Hutchinson's successful application for federal
grants, nor his publications in professional journals invited the degree of
public attention essential to attain the public figure level. Therefore, Dr.
Hutchinson was not a public figure, at least prior to the Golden Fleece
Award. 2 The Court reasoned that if Dr. Hutchinson's writings created a
public controversy it was a consequence of the Golden Fleece Award and
that "those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create
their own defense by making the claimant a public figure."83 The Court
also found that Dr. Hutchinson did not have the "regular and continuing
access to the media" which is characteristic of having become a public
figure since his access was limited to responding to the announcement of
the Golden Fleece Award.8 ' Finally, the Court expressed the concern that
to find that Dr. Hutchinson was a public figure would result in classifying
anyone who received a federal grant as a public figure.8 5
Although the Court did not make a determination of whether Dr.
Hutchinson was a public official, the Court's decision could have the ef-
fect of restricting not only who is a public figure but also who is a public
official for the purposes of applying the New York Times test. It is appar-
ent that the Hutchinson case involved an individual whose views would
be of "as much concern to the citizens as the attitudes and behavior of
public officials with respect to the same issues and events."88 Also, it is
difficult to conceive that constitutional protection afforded by New York
Times is meant to apply to the hierarchy of government officials based on
the actual or apparent importance of their position8 7 and not to a re-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 135-36. The Court did not decide whether Hutchinson was a public official.
83. Id. at 135.
84. Id. at 136. Hutchinson's access to the media was demonstrated by the fact that some
newspapers and wire services reported his response to the announcement of the Golden
Fleece Award. The Court found that Hutchinson did not have the regular and continuing
access to the media to make him a public figure for all purposes. However, if the Court had
found Hutchinson to be a limited public figure it is apparent that Hutchinson possessed
sufficient access to the media for the purpose of responding to the defamatory attacks in
relation to government spending on his study and the Golden Fleece Award.
85. Id. "[Tihe use of such subject-matter classifications to determine the extent of consti-
tutional protection afforded defamatory falsehoods may too often result in an improper bal-
ance betweeen the competing interests in this area." Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 456.
86. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
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search scientist who has received over one-half million dollars of govern-
ment funds.
In Wolston" the plaintiff sued Reader's Digest for publishing a book in
1974 in which he was falsely identified as a Soviet agent. In 1957 and
1958, Wolston had received numerous subpoenas at his home in Washing-
ton, D.C. to testify before a New York grand jury investigating Soviet
intelligence agents in the United States. 9 On one occasion, Wolston
failed to respond to a subpoena after unsuccessfully trying to persuade
law enforcement authorities not to require him to travel to New York on
account of his mental condition. Wolston later pleaded guilty to the con-
tempt charge and received a suspended sentence.90 During the six week
period between Wolson's failure to appear before the grand jury and his
sentencing, fifteen articles in Washington and New York newspapers had
been published discussing these events. The publicity subsided following
Wolston's sentencing, and he largely succeeded in returning to a private
life.
The district court held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that Wolston
was a public figure for the limited purpose of comment on his connection
with, or involvement in, Soviet espionage in the 1940's and 1950's.91 The
trial court held that by refusing to comply with the subpoena, Wolston
became involved in a controversy of a public nature that invited attention
and comment, and thereby created a public interest in knowing about his
connection with espionage. 92 The district court wrote that it was not con-
vinced that the "Supreme Court [meant] to limit public figure status to
persons with power and influence or, for that matter, even to persons who
have purposefully sought to engage the public's attention.""
The Supreme Court, in reversing, held that Wolston was not a public
figure for all purposes since "[h]e achieved no general fame or notoriety
and assumed no role of special prominence in the affairs of society as a
88. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
89. Wolston's aunt and uncle had been arrested and later pleaded guilty to espionage
charges.
90. At the hearing Wolston offered to testify before the grand jury but was refused. Wol-
ston pleaded guilty to the contempt charge after his wife, who was pregnant at the time,
became hysterical upon being called upon to testify as to his mental condition.
91. 429 F. Supp. 167, 176 (1977).
92. Id. at 176-77.
93. Id. at 175. The court held that it could not agree with Woston's "literal, restrictive
interpretations of Gertz and Firestone .... Rather, as the Court said in Gertz '[it] is pref-
erable to reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to the
nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to
the defamation.'" Id. at 174-75, citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. at 352.
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result of his contempt citation or because of his involvement in the inves-
tigation of Soviet espionage in 1958."9" The Court also held that Wolston
was not a limited public figure because the evidence did not justify find-
ing that Woiston had "voluntarily thrust" or "injected" himself into the
forefront of the public controversy surrounding the espionage investiga-
tion.95 Rather, Wolston's failure to appear seemed simply to have been
the result of his poor health."' The Court found that it was "difficult to
determine with precision the 'public controversy' into which [Wolston] is
alleged to have thrust himself. Certainly, there was no public controversy
or debate in 1958 about the desirability of permitting Soviet espionage in
the United States; all responsible citizens understandably were and are
opposed to it."'9 7
The Court held, in effect, that for Wolston to be a public figure the
Court would have to find that his failure to appear before the grand jury
was intended to affect, or did affect, an issue of public concern. The fact
that an individual becomes involved in a newsworthy event that attracts
public attention will not transform him into a public figure.'
This reasoning leads us to reject the further contention of respondents that
any person who engages in criminal conduct automatically becomes a public
figure for the purposes of comment on a limited range of issues relating to
his conviction .... To hold otherwise would create an 'open season' for all
who sought to defame persons convicted of crime."
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall,
stated that he saw no reason to adopt "so restrictive a definition of public
figure" in this case.100 The two Justices stated that they concurred only in
94. 443 U.S. at 165.
95. Id. at 166.
96. Id. at 168. The Court found that Wolston was dragged unwillingly into the contro-
versy and that he played only a minor role in whatever public controversy there may have
been in the investigation of Soviet espionage. The Court declined to hold that Wolston's
mere citation for contempt was sufficient to render Wolston a public figure for purposes of
comment on the investigation of Soviet espionage. Id. at 167.
97. Id. at 166 n.8.
Respondents urge, and the Court of Appeals apparently agreed, that the public
controversy involved the propriety of the actions of law-enforcement officials in inves-
tigating and prosecuting Soviet agents .... We may accept, arguendo, respondents'
characterization of the "public controversy" involved in this case, for it is clear that
petitioner fails to meet the other criteria established in Gertz for public-figure status.
Id. (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 168.
99. Id. at 168-69. The public interest in accurate reports of judicial proceedings is pro-
tected by Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
100. 443 U.S. at 170 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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the result because they considered the lapse of sixteen years sufficient to
render a consideration of Wolston's public figure status unnecessary.10 1
This analysis implies, of course, that one may be a public figure for pur-
poses of contemporaneous reporting of a controversial event, yet not be a
public figure for purposes of historical commentary on the same occurrence.
Historians, consequently, may well run a greater risk of liability for defama-
tion. Yet this result, in my view, does no violence to First Amendment
values.
I0 2
The reasoning behind this appears to be that historians have a greater
opportunity to research and reflect on the material they print in contrast
to newspaper reporters and radio and T.V. broadcasters.
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, stated that he believed Wol-
ston qualified as a limited public figure for the purpose of comment on
his connection with or involvement in espionage. 10 3 "The issue of Soviet
espionage in 1958 and of Wolston's involvement in that operation contin-
ues to be a legitimate topic of debate today, for that matter concerns the
security of the United States. The mere lapse of time is not decisive."'0 4
C. Conclusion
The Court in Hutchinson and Wolston seems to confirm that there is
no longer a category of involuntary public figures. It appears that if an
individual has not sought publicity in some way he cannot be required to
meet the stringent "actual malice test" of New York Times when he sues
for libel. However, the Court in Wolston did not address the issue of
whether Wolston achieved general fame or notoriety in the affairs of soci-
ety by virtue of his involuntary association with or relationship to an aunt
and uncle who pleaded guilty to espionage charges. Whether the wife of a
famous entertainer'0 5 or the children of famous parents 0 will qualify as
public figures in the future is difficult to determine. The Court seems to
have narrowed the limited public figure to one who "literally or figura-
101. Id. Contra, Time, Inc. v. Johnson, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (mere passage of time
will not necessarily insulate from the application of New York Times). See also Brewer v.
Memphis Pub. Co., 538 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1976), where the court of appeals observed that
the Supreme Court's decisions leave open the question whether a "person who has been a
public figure in the past can retreat to private status ......
102. 443 U.S. at 171 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 172 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that the spouse of a
public figure "more or less automatically becomes a part time public figure").
106. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), note 55 supra and accompa-
nying text.
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tively 'mounts a rostrum' to advocate a particular view.110 7 The test of
what is a "public controversy" seems to have been changed in the 1978
Term. In Wolston, the Court indicated that the Soviet espionage trials
involved no public controversy since "all responsible United States citi-
zens understandably were and are opposed to [Soviet espionage]." 1°05 But
is it not also true that all good citizens are opposed to college football
coaches fixing games? 0 9 In Hutchinson, the Court stated that the respon-
dents failed to point to any public controversy; rather, they pointed to a
general concern about public expenditures.11 0 The Court, in seeking to
relieve lower courts of the responsibility of determining "public interest"
in the context of libel suits by abandoning their position in Rosenbloom,
has replaced it with the complex task of defining when an individual
"thrusts" himself into a "public controversy." It gives virtually no gui-
dance as to what is considered to be a public controversy. Prior to the
Court's decisions in Wolston and Hutchinson, most lower courts, like the
lower courts in these cases, would have found espionage and government
spending to be legitimate topics of public debate.
Also, the Court left unanswered whether it is possible for a person who
was once a public figure, but who wishes to attain anonymity by with-
drawing from the limelight, to retreat to private status by the mere lapse
of time. Finally, is -it possible that Justices Blackmun and Marshall are
correct in their analysis that the first amendment constitutional privilege
is meant in some instances to extend to reporters, but that that same
protection will be denied historians writing about the same individuals?
Unfortunately, the Hutchinson and Wolston decisions have not only
failed to answer questions that have long perplexed the lower courts in
defamation cases, but have raised even more complex issues to be re-
solved in the future. As one first amendment expert has noted, one effect
of the Hutchinson and Wolston decisions will necessarily be to "limit
what the public learns about real criminals, about possible wastes of pub-
lic funds, and about others whose conduct and misconduct affect us
all."'111
IV. MALICE
The common law's qualified privilege of "fair comment" allowed publi-
107. 443 U.S. at 169 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 166 n.8.
109. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
110. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
111. Floyd Abrams, Washington Post, June 27, 1979, at A-10, col. 1.
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cation of comments or opinions criticizing the actions of public officials." 2
In New York Times"3 the Supreme Court held that as a first amendment
requirement, publication of defamatory falsehoods concerning the official
conduct of such persons was not actionable as libel unless the publisher
was guilty of "actual malice." As discussed above, Hutchinson and Wol-
ston appear to have restricted the applicability of the public figure label
to a libel plaintiff. The Supreme Court's most recent decision on the issue
of proving malice, Herbert v. Lando,"4 facilitates the ability of a libel
plaintiff who is classified as a public figure to discover evidence to help
prove his case.
In Herbert the Court attempted to affirm the observation of one com-
mentator that New York Times merely extended the common law; it did
not create a new rule at the urging of modern journalists.1 5 However, the
support for the opinion seems to say simply that the pendulum has swung
far enough in favor of the press. The Herbert decision recognized that
New York Times "effected major changes in the standards applicable to
civil libel actions,"' 6 but demonstrated that plaintiffs still retain full use
of modern discovery tools.
A. Origin and Development of the "Actual Malice" Standard
The Supreme Court in New York Times adopted the minority view
that the common law "fair comment" privilege protects false assertions of
fact if they were made for the public benefit with an honest belief in their
truth.1 7 The Court stated,
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that pro-
112. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 819.
113. 376 U.S. 254. The inappropriateness of the term "actual malice" will be discussed
below. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 821; Eaton, supra note 27, at 1370 n.87.
The New York Times standard has been applied in causes of action other than libel. Old
Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Assn. of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)
(standard applied to federal labor law); Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High
School Dist. 205, Will Co., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (teacher exercised his right to speak on issues
of public importance and the school attempted to fire him); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967) (state statute did not create a cause of action for libel, but did create one for un-
wanted publicity).
114. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). The decision allows public libel plaintiffs to discover the
thoughts, opinions, conclusions and conversations of the journplists responsible for publish-
ing the allegedly libelous article.
115. Eaton, supra note 27, at 1366. "If the majority opinion in New York Times is read to
the last line of the last footnote, it becomes clear that the Court was working with existing
common law models and was not fashioning new tort law out of whole cloth."
116. 441 U.S. at 159.
117. See notes 1-15 supra and accompanying text.
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hibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with 'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not." 8
To hold otherwise, the Court felt, would result in a rule that "dampens
the vigor and limits the variety of public debate."1 1 9 The Court's decision,
however, stirred a decade of legal debate on the meaning of "actual mal-
ice.' 120 Although the Court's definition of the term appears to be clear
from a reading of the opinion, it spent ten years and a number of cases
reiterating that it did not mean common law malice. 2 ' The problem has
not gone unnoticed, prompting one Justice to write, "I have come greatly
to regret the use in [New York Times] of the phrase 'actual malice.' "122
The Court still employs the term, 23 but in a series of cases since New
York Times it has shown not only what malice is not, '2 but also what it
is.
New York Times defined actual malice as publishing a statement with
"knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.""125 That same year the Court elaborated, limiting actionable
statements to "only those false statements made with [a] high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity.""2 s It is sufficient to show "intent to
118. 376 U.S. at 279-80. This has been referred to as "unquestionably the greatest victory
won by the defendants in the modem history of the law of torts." PROSSER, supra note 7, at
819.
119. 376 U.S. at 279.
120. 31 VAND. L. REV. 375 (1978); 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 286 (1978); Eaton, supra note
27, at 1375 n.113 (citing cases where plaintiffs have shown the requisite malice). A decade
later the Court was still finding it necessary to take time to correct lower courts' definitions
of malice. See Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
121. 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (common law definition of malice is an improper jury instruc-
tion); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. at 52 n.18 (1970) ("ill will toward the plain-
tiff, or bad motives, are not elements of the New York Times standard"); Greenbelt Coop.
Pub. Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (malice defined as spite, hostility or deliberate
intention to harm); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) ("reckless conduct is
not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have
investigated before publishing"); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967)
(bad or corrupt motive, personal spite, ill will or a desire to injure plaintiff); Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1965) (negligent misstatement of fact); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356
(1965) (intent to inflict harm); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (ill will, speaking
out of hatred).
122. 441 U.S. at 199 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See PROSSER, supra note 7, at 821; Eaton,
supra note 27, at 1370 n.87.
123. 441 U.S. at 160.
124. See note 121 supra.
125. 376 U.S. at 280.
126. 379 U.S. at 74.
[Vol. 14:737
PUBLIC FIGURES AND MALICE
inflict harm through falsehood,"12 7 or that "the defendant in fact enter-
tained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication."12 In Herbert the
Court summarized the rules, stating, "[s]uch 'subjective awareness of
probable falsity' may be found if 'there are obvious reasons to doubt the
veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.' '"12
In Butts the public official doctrine was extended to public figures.130
Justice Harlan, writing the opinion of the Court,131 decreed a slightly dif-
ferent test for proving malice by public figure plaintiffs.132 The Chief Jus-
tice, however, joined by four concurring Justices,' 3 stated in his concur-
rence that, "differentiation between 'public figures' and 'public officials'
and adoption of separate standards of proof for each have no basis in law,
logic, or First Amendment policy.' 3 4 Thus the same test applies in either
case.
The foregoing cases appear to have settled the question of what test
applies in a libel action by a public figure against the publisher of defam-
atory falsehood. The recent Herbert decision should eliminate virtually
all questions about the ability of a public plaintiff to gather the necessary
information to meet his burden of proof.
B. Herbert v. Lando
1. Background
Anthony Herbert came to national attention in March, 1971, when he
accused his superior officers of covering up Vietnam war crimes on the
part of the United States.'13 Herbert had been relieved of command after
pressing his charges in spite of the lack of interest on the part of his
superior officers.138  Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS),
127. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965).
128. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). The majority opinion admitted
that this may encourage ignorance and dampen the publisher's desire to investigate, so he
would not suspect falsehood.
129. 441 U.S. at 156-57 (citations omitted).
130. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
131. Justice Harlan was joined by Justices Clark, Stewart and Fortas.
132. "[H]ighly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at
155.
133. Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and White.
134. Id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
135. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1977).
136. Id. Herbert served in Korea where he earned a Bronze Star, three Silver Stars and
four Purple Hearts by age 22. In 1968 he returned to war in Vietnam as a batallion com-
mander in the 173rd Airborne Brigade. He earned another seven medals in less than two
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culminated the media attention given Herbert on February 4, 1973, with
a segment on its program "60 Minutes" entitled, "The Selling of Colonel
Herbert." 187 Mike Wallace narrated the program, with Barry Lando as
producer and editor.8s In addition, Lando contributed an article to the
Atlantic Monthly entitled, "The Herbert Affair."'' 3 The tone of both of
these reports, "cast serious doubts upon Herbert's veracity and concluded
that the American press had been deluded by Herbert's story.' 40
Herbert subsequently instituted a libel action against CBS, Lando,
Wallace and Atlantic Monthly, claiming Lando deliberately distorted the
record, and that Atlantic Monthly republished the statements knowing
they were false.' 4 ' Herbert conceded he was a public figure for New York
Times purposes, and proceeded to depose Lando at great length to obtain
the evidence he needed to prove "actual malice.' '142
Lando objected to certain questions inquiring into his thoughts, opin-
ions and conclusions while working on the story, on the ground of first
amendment protection. 143 The district court denied his objection, and on
interlocutory appeal the court of appeals vindicated the contentions of
Lando and his fellow reporters,"4 and ruled that requiring such questions
months. Herbert was relieved after 58 days of command. Washington Post, October 1, 1979
at B-3, col. 1.
137. 568 F.2d at 982.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Herbert sued for 44.7 million
dollars.
142. The deposition lasted over a year, filled 2903 pages of transcript and contained an
additional 240 exhibits. 441 U.S. at 202 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
143. The court of appeals grouped the objectionable questions into five categories:
1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations regarding people or
leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the "60 Minutes" seg-
ment and the Atlantic Monthly article;
2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of mind
with respect to the veracity of persons interviewed;
3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a conclusion
concerning the veracity of persons, information or events;
4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or ex-
cluded from the broadcast publication; and
5. Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision to include or exclude certain
material.
568 F.2d at 983.
144. Amici curiae briefs were filed with the appellate court on behalf of the American
Society of Newspaper Editors, Chicago Sun-Times, Chicago Daily News, The Miami Her-
ald Publishing Co., National Broadcasting Co., Inc., The New York Times Co., and Radio
Television News Directors As'n. Id. at 975.
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to be answered would chill the very thought processes of journalists and
"consume the very values which the [New York Times] landmark deci-
sion sought to safeguard.
1 45
The dissenting opinion argued that Herbert's inquiries were proper.
"Obviously, such a review has a 'chilling' or deterrent effect. It is sup-
posed to. The publication of lies should be discouraged .... The major-
ity's attempt to eliminate or reduce that chill is supportable in neither
precedent nor logic. '146
2. Supreme Court Opinion
Herbert applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which
was granted.1 47 The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, refusing
to,
hold for the first time that when a member of the press is alleged to have
circulated damaging falsehoods and is sued for injury to the plaintiffs repu-
tation, the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the editorial processes of
those responsible for the publication, even though the inquiry would pro-
duce evidence material to the proof of a critical element of his cause of
action. 48
The Court felt that the expanded first amendment protection urged by
Lando would put too great a burden on public libel plaintiffs, a burden
already heavy under New York Times.149 The six man majority decided
that the press was already sufficiently protected under the New York
Times line of cases, and concluded that direct inquiry on the ultimate
issue of knowledge should not stifle truthful publication substantially
more than the indirect proof Lando urged the Court to require.150 Thus
the Court ruled that in order to meet his burden of proof, a public libel
plaintiff may inquire into the thoughts, opinions and conclusions of the
145. Id. at 984.
146. Id. at 995-96 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
147. Herbert v. Lando, 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
148. 441 U.S. at 155. The press response was obvious in the following day's New York
Times headline, "Newsmen Dealt Blow on Defense in Suits for Libel." The article stated,
"[t]he reaction from journalists was immediate and strongly negative." New York Times,
April 19, 1979, at 1, col. 2. Bill Leonard, president of CBS News, called the ruling, "another
dangerous invasion of the nation's newsrooms." Washington Post, April 19, 1979, at A-16,
col. 1.
149. 441 U.S. at 170. The New York Times burden, expanded to include public figures in
Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. 130 (1967), has proven a difficult hurdle for public libel
plaintiffs. For a collection of seventeen cases in eleven years since New York Times where
libel has been shown, see Eaton, supra note 27, at 1375 n.113.
150. 441 U.S. 172-73.
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people responsible for publishing a libelous article, "where there is a spe-
cific claim of injury arising from a publication that is alleged to have been
knowing or recklessly false." 15 1 The Court made clear, however, that this
right of inquiry is limited, and that the first amendment does insulate the
editorial process from "private or official examination [designed] merely
to satisfy curiosity or to serve some general end such as the public
interest. 15
2
The Herbert decision meshes well with New York Times and its prog-
eny. The press, which has been referred to as "the only organized private
business that is given explicit constitutional protection," 53 was put in a
superior position by the 1964 ruling.'" It would be unjustifiable to totally
shield the press from liability for printing statements it knows or has rea-
son to suspect are false. Such journalism is irresponsible, not in the public
interest, and not an element of freedom of the press. 5 5 The balance be-
tween no special protection and complete insulation was reasonably
struck in New York Times.5 6 To win a libel suit against the press, a pub-
lic plaintiff must show that the allegedly libelous article was published
with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity.157 The determinative
issue in such a suit is what the defendant knew or believed. Obviously,
the most relevant and material evidence on this point is the defendant's
own admissions about what he felt and thought. Unlike recognized privi-
leges such as the marital and attorney-client privileges, the social consid-
erations present do not favor the press. The privilege would protect
libelous statements, and would deny a defamed public plaintiff access to
the most valuable evidence available to him.
The Herbert Court felt compelled to find that the press was not
shielded from discovery methods in a libel suit. 58 However, even though
151. Id. at 174.
152. Id.
153. Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGs L.J., 631, 633 (1975). Justice Stewart dis-
cusses various ways the Court has protected the press.
154. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See note 147 supra. See also Note,
Developing Standard of Care After Time, Inc. v. Firestone: Experimentation is Needed, 29
MERCER L. REV. 841 (1978).
155. "[D]amages liability for defamation abridges neither freedom of speech nor freedom
of the press." 441 U.S. at 160.
156. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
157. Id.
158. 441 U.S. at 158-69. The facility of the result is shown by the 8-1 vote on the question
of inquiry into a reporter's thought processes. Justice Stewart dissented because he felt that
"inquiry into the broad 'editorial process' is simply not relevant in a libel suit" of this na-
ture. 441 U.S. at 199 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented on
the issue of communications among the respondents, category no. 4 in note 143. Id. at 181
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the Court reached the desired result, the relative weakness of the sup-
porting authority in much of the majority opinion does not adequately
justify the holding.159
Part R of the majority opinion by Justice White has two basic themes
running through it. First, that this type of 'editorial process evidence has
never been objected to in the past,6 0 and second, that at common law
this type of evidence has always been admissible to show malice when
necessary for punitive damages.' Both of these contentions fall short of
being solid support for the liberal discovery rule emanating from Herbert;
therefore, the decision rests heavily on the balancing test in Part 11.162
a. Absence of Past Objections
In Part H of the majority opinion, Justice White first observed that in
the past the Court has dealt with cases in which the record contained
some evidence that might be considered part of the editorial process
under Lando's definition. 163 In these cases, Justice White pointed out, the
Court did not even intimate that this type of evidence may be im-
proper."" Thus, he concluded, the Court in the past felt that the prac-
tices were constitutional, and therefore it should not alter its traditional
stance now. 6 5 While this argument seems logical, the flaw in it is that the
propriety of the inquiries was never an issue before the Supreme Court
until Herbert.
The Court has occasionally decided a case on an issue that was not
briefed or argued before the Court, but the practice has been rare, and
criticism has been leveled at the Court when it occurs. 66 The usual proce-
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part), 208-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
communication issue dissent, see note 208 infra.
159. See notes 163-97 infra and accompanying text.
160. See notes 163-71 infra and accompanying text.
161. See notes 172-97 infra and accompanying text.
162. 441 U.S. 169-75. See notes 198-214 infra and accompanying text.
163. 441 U.S. at 160.
164. Id. at 161 n.6. "It is quite unlikely that the Court would have arrived at the result it
did had it believed that inquiry into the editorial processes was constitutionally forbidden."
165. Id. at 168-69. However, stare decisis is not always applicable. "[I]n cases involving
the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossi-
ble, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions." Barnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
166. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 676 (1961) (the issue upon which the decision
was based was "briefed not at all and argued only extremely tangentially") (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). "I would think that our obligation to the States, on whom we impose this new rule,
as well as the obligation of orderly adherence to our own processes would demand that we
seek that aid which adequate briefing and argument lends to the determination of an impor-
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dure is to decide the case before the Court on the narrow issues that have
been raised, avoiding constitutional questions when at all possible. 67 The
lack of objection in the past cases, therefore, should not weigh heavily in
a decision on a constitutional issue.168
Lower court cases are also cited to show that courts have accepted this
type of evidence in the past,16 but, as will be discussed below, only two of
these admitted evidence over objection that would probably be consid-
ered objectionable by Lando.170 The fact that there have been no objec-
tions raised in the past, and courts have not done so on their own, is not a
strong argument to support a decision of constitutional magnitude.117
b. Admissibility of Editorial Process Evidence at Common Law
The second theme in Part II of Justice White's opinion is that the com-
mon law has always allowed the type of evidence objected to by Lando.
Reliance upon such state-of-mind evidence is by no means a recent devel-
opment arising from New York Times and similar cases. Rather, it is deeply
rooted in the common-law rule, predating the First Amendment, that a
showing of malice on the part of the defendant permitted plaintiffs to re-
cover punitive or enhanced damages. 172
A showing of malice was also important with the common law fair com-
ment privilege,17 3 which could be defeated by demonstrating malice on
the part of the defendant. This is the same type of proof required by New
York Times,174 and Justice White observed, "[c]ourts have traditionally
admitted any direct or indirect evidence relevant to the state of mind of
tant issue." Id.
167. "'The most important thing we do is not doing,' said Justice Brandeis once in this
connection." H. ABRAHAM, THE JuDicIARY 177-78 (4th ed. 1977); "If there is one doctrine
more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we
ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoid-
able." Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.).
168. Numerous landmark cases overturned prior practice when the Court upheld a chal-
lenge to the practice. In these cases, the Court waited until the particular challenge, as is
present in Herbert, to reverse prior practices. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
169. 441 U.S. at 165-67 n.15.
170. Johnson Pub. Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 124 So.2d 441 (1960); Sandora v. Times,
Co., 113 Conn. 574, 155 A. 819 (1931). See also notes 180, 182 infra.
171. See note 168 supra.
172. 441 U.S. at 161-62.
173. See note 117 supra.
174. The only difference was that the common law courts included common law malice as
a sufficient proof, which New York Times does not. See note 121 supra.
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the defendant and necessary to defeat a conditional privilege. .. .
Justice White's argument seems persuasive. The practice has been so
extensive in the past that it would be difficult to admit error now. How-
ever, in the words of Justice Holmes, "[w]hat usually is done may be evi-
dence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a
standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or
not.1176 More importantly, the cases cited by Justice White to support his
analysis of the common law do not necessarily lead to the result reached
in Herbert. In an extensive footnote,177 Justice White cited a number of
cases, dating back to 1837, and stated,
In scores of libel cases courts have addressed the general issue of the ad-
missibility of evidence that would be excluded under the editorial process
privilege asserted here and have affirmed the relevance and admissibility of
the evidence on behalf of libel plaintiffs.
None of these cases as much as suggested that there were special limits
applicable to the press on the discoverability of such evidence, either before
or during trial. 8
The problem is that most of the cited cases deal with items of evidence
that would probably not fall into Lando's proposed category. Lando ar-
gued that his conclusions, thoughts, opinions and conversations with co-
defendant Wallace should be privileged.17 9 Only two of the cited cases
admitted evidence over objection that would probably be considered priv-
ileged under Lando's scheme. The court in Sandora v. Times Co.1s0 ex-
cluded several "editorial privilege" type questions because they were not
relevant and admitted one. In that case, the city editor of a newspaper
was required to answer questions about how the prominence of the sub-
ject affected the intensity of the investigation. 81
In Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis82 the defendant's magazine pub-
175. 441 U.S. at 165.
176. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468,470 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (discussing stan-
dards of care in a negligence action). See note 164 supra.
177. 441 U.S. at 165-67 n.15.
178. Id.
179. See note 143 supra for the types of questions Lando argued should be prohibited.
180. 113 Conn. 574, 155 A. 819, 823 (1931). The court excluded questions of the reporter
about whether he had ever had occasion to disbelieve people and whether the city editor
could physically check all in-coming stories. Also excluded was a question of the editor
about prior reliance on his reporter's information.
181. Id., 155 A. at 823.
182. 271 Ala. 474, 124 So.2d 441, 445-56 (1960). The plaintiff had been on trial for the
attempted murder of the Reverend Ralph Abernathy. He was accused of attacking Aberna-
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lished an article asserting that Davis had resigned from a prior teaching
position because he had engaged in sexual relations with students.18 3 The
Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the editor of the magazine could be
cross examined about whether he intended to convey the meaning that
plaintiff had been forced to resign because of the charges brought against
him.'" The inquiries in these two cases went to the mental processes of
the defendants, which is the type of questioning objected to by Lando.
The courts' rulings in Sandora and Davis thus support the result reached
in Herbert. However, the other cases cited by Justice White are less
helpful.
In Freeman v. Mills s" the evidence at issue was a communication be-
tween the defendant and the Los Angeles Turf Club. Lando did not ob-
ject to questions concerning communications between those responsible
for publication and third parties, so this would most likely not fall under
Lando's asserted privilege and should therefore be admissible.8 6 Scott v.
Times-Mirror Co.18 7 dealt with written items, which do not intrude into
the thought processes of the publisher, and therefore are not items which
Herbert would have affected.'"
The readers' states of mind were held admissible in one cited case to
show the publication's effect on them for the purpose of establishing the
libelous nature of the article.18 9 Another ruled merely that "the surround-
ing circumstances and conditions must be taken into account....
One case admitted evidence of subsequent repetition of the alleged libel
thy with a pistol and hatchet during a confrontation over Abernathy's alleged affair with his
wife. The alleged libelous statement was published in an article about the Reverend Martin
Luther King attending the trial.
183. Id., 124 So.2d at 445-56.
184. Id., 124 So.2d at 461.
185. 97 Cal. App.2d 161, 217 P.2d 687 (1950).
186. See note 143 supra for the types of questions Lando argued should be prohibited.
187. 181 Cal. 345, 184 P. 672 (1919). At issue were other publications by the defendant,
the complaint filed in a separate case, and a biographical sketch of the plaintiff. The court
based its holding of admissibility upon a earlier California decision, Davis v. Hearst, 160
Cal. 143, 116 P. 530, 548 (1911), which held that the actual intent of the defendant is impor-
tant only to show that the plaintiff was the object of the libel ivhere it is unclear whether or
not he was harmed, or as evidence offered by the defendant to rebut the charge of malice.
Thus it appears that these courts did not intend that, or consider whether, the type of
questions objected to by Lando would be admissible.
188. See note 143 supra for the types of questions Lando argued should be prohibited.
189. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Vickers, 71 Ga. App. 204, 30 S.E.2d 440 (1944).
190. Cook v. East Shore Newspaper, 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 751, 764 (1945). The
surrounding circumstances the court was concerned with were the original language of the
article, the mode and extent of publication, evidence of previous ill will, and former libels.
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by the defendant; 1 ' another admitted evidence of three earlier attacks on
the plaintiff by the defendant, which the defendant admitted were evi-
dence of malice.192
These cases, along with the ten others cited by Justice White in this
part of the footnote,""3 deal with items of evidence that fall outside the
zone of protection advocated by Lando."" They do not support the result
reached in Herbert because none of them involved evidence which would
be excluded if the Court had ruled in favor of Lando.
Additionally, Justice White cited twenty-three cases in which the
courts have admitted "editorial process" evidence on behalf of the defen-
dants.195 This affords a weak basis, however, for denying a constitutional
privilege. Several constitutional privileges protect the assertor;196 he can-
not be forced to act against his will, but in each case the person can waive
the constitutional privilege on his own volition. By analogy, even if the
privilege proposed by Lando was adopted, newsmen would still be able to
191. Berger v. Freeman Tribune Pub. Co., 132 Iowa 290, 109 N.W. 784 (1906).
192. Conroy v. Fall River Herald News Co., 306 Mass. 448, 28 N.E.2d 729 (1940).
193. 441 U.S. at 165-67 n.15. The ten other cases cited by Justice White are Rice v. Sim-
mons, 2 Har. 309, 31 Am. Dec. 766 (Del. 1837) (the testimony of defendant's witnesses was
objected to because it would be permitting the party to make evidence for himself); Thomp-
son v. Globe Newspaper Co., 279 Mass. 176, 181 N.E. 249 (1932) (the plaintiff was not al-
lowed to introduce testimony of reporters and their editors to show malice on an agency
theory because the court said the agents were not responsible for the publication); Cyrowski
v. Polish-American Pub. Co., 196 Mich. 648, 163 N.W. 58 (1917) (the testimony of third
persons who advised the defendant to question the plaintiff about the truth or falsity of
allegations before publishing them was admitted to show the effect on the defendant's state
of mind); Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N.W. 974, 976 (1925) (proof of
malice is sufficient "[i]f it appears that the publisher knows" about the falsity; this could be
shown by evidence of personal ill feeling, the exaggerated language used, and the mode and
extent of publication); Cook v. Globe Printing Co., 227 Mo. 471, 127 S.W. 332 (1910) (when
a previous charge was made by the defendant, the plaintiff and two witnesses went to defen-
dant's office and told him it was false, so when he printed the story he had full knowledge);
Butler v. Gazette Co., 119 App. Div. 767, 104 N.Y.S. 637 (1907) (depositions which had been
stipulated as evidence for the court); Briggs v. Byrd, 34 N.C. 377 (1851) (comments by
plaintiff to witnesses); McBurney v. Times Pub. Co., 93 R.I. 331, 175 A.2d 170 (1961) (state-
ment by the defendant to plaintiff); Lancour v. Herald & Globe Ass'n 112 Vt. 471, 28 A.2d
396 (1942) (subsequent publication); Farrar v. Tribune Pub. Co., 57 Wash.2d 549, 358 P.2d
792 (1961) (evidence offered on behalf of the defendant). Rice and Farrar deal with evidence
admitted on behalf of the defendant, and therefore belong in the second category of cases in
Justice White's footnote. See notes 195-96 infra and accompanying text.
194. See note 143 supra for the types of questions Lando argued should be prohibited.
195. 441 U.S. at 166-67 n.15.
196. Among these privileges are the fourth amendment protection against illegal search
and seizure, the fifth amendment protection against self incrimination and the sixth amend-
ment right to a jury trial.
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offer editorial process evidence on their own behalf or waive the privilege
and answer plaintiff's questions. Consequently, the fact that the question-
ing has never been objected to in the past could simply mean that news-
men have never chosen to invoke the privilege until now.
An examination of prior cases reveals that the common law does not
clearly support the new holding, except by implication and extension.
The cases apparently held that all relevant evidence is admissible, but
very few appear to have considered the areas of discovery to which Lando
objected. 197 The decision should therefore be predicated on something
other than precedent. Justice White supplied another basis in Part III of
the majority opinion.
c. Balancing
In the third part of his opinion, Justice White discussed the competing
interests on both sides of the Herbert issue.19s The result was a balancing
of concerns in which the Court felt that the interests of the individual
outweighed the intrusion on the press.1 9
The last fifteen years have demonstrated that the New York Times
standard is the appropriate doctrine to protect the press under the first
amendment.200 "At the same time, however, the Court has reiterated its
conviction ... that the individual's interest in his reputation is also a
basic concern."20 1 The substantially increased burden the proposed privi-
lege would place upon public libel plaintiffs requires that the case for the
privilege be clear and convincing before the Court would make the
change.202
The major argument put forth by the press was that "requiring disclo-
sure of editorial conversations and of a reporter's conclusions about the
veracity of the material he has gathered will have an intolerable chilling
effect on the editorial process and editorial decision-making. 203 The
Court, though, stated that denying the privilege would not result in the
197. Johnson Pub. Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 124 So.2d 441 (1960); Sandora v. Times Co.,
113 Conn. 574, 155 A. 819 (1931).
198. 441 U.S. at 169-75.
199. Id. Even the Washington Post admitted in an editorial that, "the claim may well
have been too broad, given the value with which it was colliding." Washington Post, April
20, 1979, at 14, col. 1.
200. 441 U.S. at 169. For cases reaffirming New York Times, see notes 125-29 supra.
201. 441 U.S. at 169.
202. Id. at 170.
203. Id. at 171.
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suppression of truthful information,204 and that direct evidence should
not be "substantially more suspect" than the indirect evidence to which
the press has not objected. 0 5 The Court concluded, "[o]nly knowing or
reckless error will be discouraged; and unless there is to be an absolute
First Amendment privilege to inflict injury by knowing or reckless con-
duct, which respondents do not suggest, constitutional values will not be
threatened.
20 6
The Court decided the issue of discovery of Lando's thoughts and con-
clusions by an 8-1 vote.217 It was split more evenly on the issue of conver-
sations between Lando and Wallace. 208 Justices Brennan 2 9 and Mar-
shall,210 dissenting on this point, believed that allowing such inquiry
would dampen prepublication discussion and impair the quality of jour-
nalism. Marshall was willing to go further than Brennan by giving abso-
lute privilege to the expressions of misgivings among journalists.21 1 Bren-
nan felt that in-house conversations should be privileged until the
plaintiff has made a prima facie case of falsity.21 2 The majority believed
that the exposure to liability under New York Times would increase re-
sort to prepublication conversations to avoid errors,21 3 thus it rejected
Marshall's argument. The majority also rejected Brennan's argument as a
"burdensome complication" if it called for a bifurcated trial, or a mere
formalism if it simply required an affidavit or verification of the
pleadings. 14
204. Id. at 172. "Of course, if inquiry into editorial conclusions threatens the suppression
not only of information known or strongly suspected to be unreliable but also of truthful
information, the issue would be quite different." Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 173. See note 146 supra and accompanying text for a similar argument ex-
pressed by the dissent in the court of appeals decision.
207. Note 158 supra. See note 143 supra for the types of questions objected to.
208. Id.
209. 441 U.S. at 194 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
210. Id. at 209 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211. Id. "It is not enough, I believe, to accord a discovery privilege that would yield
before any plaintiff who can make a prima facie showing of falsity... Unless a journalist
knows with some certitude that his misgivings will enjoy protection, they may remain unex-
pressed." Id. (Citations omitted).
212. Id. at 197.
213. Id. at 174. "[W]e find it difficult to believe that error-avoiding procedures will be
terminated or stifled simply because there is liability for culpable error and because the
editorial process will itself be examined in a tiny percentage of instances in which error is
claimed and litigation ensues." Id.
214. Id. at 174-75 n.23.
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C. Conclusion
The result of the balancing done by the Court, and the inferences that
can be drawn from history, is that a public figure in a libel suit can ques-
tion the responsible journalists, apparently without limit, to obtain evi-
dence of their knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity. If plaintiffs
abuse the privilege, the Court may find it necessary to return and clarify
the holding, though in light of the extent of Lando's deposition," 5 which
the Court recited without objection, it may be hard to ever show that a
plaintiff has abused his discovery right. This aspect of the decision is
most worrisome to the press. "While the claim may well have been too
broad, given the value with which it was colliding, the way in which the
Court brushed it aside opens the door to serious limitations on freedom of
the press."216 However, the Supreme Court felt that this would not be a
problem, and only time will tell if the decision will be as detrimental to
the free press as some warn.17
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Hutchinson, Wolston, and Herbert has indi-
cated its intention to limit and redefine the first amendment privilege
applicable to public figures in libel actions. The Court has retreated from
its earlier stand in libel cases which took the New York Times standard
and the logical implications inherent in the holding to extend a greater
constitutional protection to the press. The Court has tried to harmonize
and balance the equally desirable ideals of affording an individual the
protection and integrity of his reputation with the importance of a free
press. It is apparent from the latest decisions of the Court that the bal-
ance in recent years has shifted in favor of the individual. The Court, in
the 1978 Term, has expressed an unwillingness to afford the press any
increased constitutional protection. In fact, if the Court continues to fol-
low the trend in its recent decisions of redefining and limiting the consti-
tutional privilege, the potential consequence could lead in the future to
an even greater infringement on the freedom previously enjoyed by the
press.
215. See note 142 supra.
216. Washington Post, April 20, 1979, at 14, col. 1.
217. Bill Leonard, President of CBS News, called the ruling, "another dangerous invasion
of the nation's newsrooms." Washington Post, April 19, 1979, at 1, col. 5. The fears of the
press may be reflected by the recent availability of first amendment insurance to cover the
costs of defending libel suits. Washington Post, October 2, 1979, at 14, col. 1.
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